The Relevance of the Ultimatum: A Political Gesture or a Genuine Strategy?

The Nigerian military recently issued a 24-hour ultimatum to terrorist groups, demanding they either surrender or face full military action. This follows a horrific series of events, including the execution of Brigadier General Musa Uba by terrorists, the abduction of 25 female schoolchildren from Kebbi State, and an attack on the Christ Apostolic Church (CAC) in Eruku, Kwara State, where three worshippers were killed and several others including the pastor were abducted.

In response, President Bola Ahmed Tinubu expressed his deep sorrow over the death of Nigerian soldiers and the abduction of the young schoolgirls. He urged security agencies to act swiftly to bring the girls back. However, with the rising tide of insecurity in the country and a string of unfulfilled promises from past administrations, many are left wondering: how effective can this ultimatum be?

The ultimatum is the latest in a series of government responses to a growing terrorist and banditry problem that has gripped much of northern Nigeria. Issued under the assumption that military force will compel terrorists to lay down their arms, it seeks to portray the Nigerian government as decisive and unwavering. However, many Nigerians remain skeptical, questioning the real impact of such measures.

Historically, similar threats have often been followed by little or no tangible outcomes. Military operations, though launched with great fanfare, frequently fail to decisively weaken terrorist groups, who often regroup and continue their activities, sometimes with even greater intensity. In this context, the ultimatum raises serious questions about its effectiveness.

One of the most controversial aspects of the Nigerian response to terrorism has been the involvement of Sheikh Ahmad Gumi, a controversial cleric who has claimed to have engaged in negotiations with the terrorists. According to Gumi, the bandits and terrorists promised to cease their activities if they were treated with the same respect and rights as other Nigerians. This has sparked outrage, with critics accusing Gumi of enabling the terrorists and legitimizing their demands.

While some argue that Gumi’s efforts may be aimed at finding a peaceful solution, the idea of negotiating with individuals who have committed grave atrocities raises concerns about the government’s approach. If terrorist groups are given a platform to negotiate, rather than being pursued and defeated, the line between legitimate state authority and terrorist demands becomes dangerously blurred.

It is also important to note that the government’s approach to the ultimatum seems to contradict Gumi’s stance. While Gumi suggests a diplomatic solution, the military’s ultimatum implies that there is no room for negotiation. This disconnect between different government responses adds to the confusion about the country’s strategy for dealing with terrorism.

Yahuza Getso, a security, intelligence, and investigations expert, has stated that “99.9% of the bandits operating in North-West and North-Central Nigeria are Nigerians.” He further emphasized, “We know them, we know who they are, we know where they are. They are not in any hideout or any difficult terrain.”

This statement brings to light one of the most perplexing issues in Nigeria’s fight against terrorism: if the government knows where the terrorists are and who they are, why haven’t they been arrested? Getso’s claim suggests that these individuals are not some faceless, unknown enemies hiding in remote areas but are instead operating within local communities, often with impunity.

If the Nigerian military truly knows the identities and locations of these terrorists, the question arises: why haven’t they been neutralized? This knowledge should theoretically make it easier to carry out targeted military actions, but it appears the government is either unable or unwilling to take the necessary steps to capture or eliminate these groups. The failure to act, despite having such critical intelligence, casts doubt on the government’s commitment and competence in addressing the terrorism crisis.

The 24-hour ultimatum issued by the military has created a sense of urgency, but without accompanying actions, it risks becoming yet another empty promise. The key question is: how serious is the Nigerian government about following through on this threat?

If the government is genuinely prepared to back the ultimatum with decisive military action, it could send a powerful message to the terrorists. However, without a clear and sustained strategy, the threat of military action could simply serve as a public relations exercise designed to placate citizens, rather than a meaningful step toward resolution.

The fundamental issue is not just the ultimatum itself, but the lack of strategic coherence in Nigeria’s counter-terrorism efforts. With many terrorist groups still active, despite the government’s stated resolve, it appears there is a disconnect between the rhetoric of action and the reality on the ground.

Moreover, there is a growing perception that the terrorists are being allowed to thrive in certain regions because of weak governance, corruption, or even political or ethnic affiliations that enable them to operate freely. If the military is incapable of confronting these groups directly, or if they are being undermined by internal forces, the ultimatum becomes little more than a futile declaration.

One of the more troubling questions raised by the current situation is whether the terrorists are, in fact, more powerful than the Nigerian military. Despite the country’s significant resources and military capabilities, these groups continue to operate with relative ease in large parts of the country. This raises the possibility that the Nigerian military, even with its advanced technology and large numbers, may be hindered by corruption, bureaucratic inefficiency, or poor coordination.

This imbalance leads to another important question: If the Nigerian military is unable to defeat a relatively small group of terrorists operating within its borders, what does that say about the country’s security infrastructure? It is no longer just about whether the military can win this fight; it’s about whether the military can act decisively and effectively.

The question of how effective the military’s ultimatum will be boils down to one crucial factor: action. If the Nigerian government is serious about confronting terrorism, it must move beyond issuing threats and ultimatums. The government must demonstrate that it has both the will and the capacity to tackle terrorism head-on.

For the ultimatum to have any real impact, the military must back it up with well-coordinated, sustained operations that target the leaders of these groups, dismantle their networks, and eliminate their safe havens. In addition, addressing the underlying political, economic, and social issues that contribute to the rise of terrorism in Nigeria must be part of the broader strategy.

Without meaningful follow-through, the ultimatum will remain just another declaration in a long line of failed promises. The Nigerian people deserve a government that is not only willing to talk tough but also prepared to take the hard actions needed to restore security and protect the nation from terrorism.

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